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ARTICLES
The State of Asylum Representation:
Ideas for Change
ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ AND JONATHAN JACOBS*
The plight of refugees-those who flee persecution-touches a chord with
Americans, who have supported both a substantial overseas resettlement
program and a fair system for asylum seekers. U.S. laws provide a seemingly
full opportunity for asylum applicants to explain their fear or actual experi-
ence of persecution. In fact, the U.S. offers an extensive process of inter-
views, hearings, and appeals to ensure that bona fide refugees are not sent
back to their persecutors. The substantive law, too, has been developed
considerably through administrative and judicial precedents. But how mean-
ingful is a process that, no matter how extensive and developed, leaves
asylum seekers on their own to present their claims when only experts
understand how the process works and what the case law means?
Asylum applicants often have escaped life threatening situations in their
home countries and have overcome financial and physical obstacles to reach
the United States, only to be faced with a daunting and confusing asylum
application process. Legal assistance is permitted, but it must be at no
expense to the government.' While some asylum seekers find competent
representation, many do not.2 Most of the key players in the U.S. asylum
process-the representatives, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") trial attorneys, the Asylum Officers and the Immigration Judges-
believe that representation makes a difference for those seeking relief and for
the effectiveness of the system.3 Immigration Court data indicates that
* Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Director of Law and Policy Studies, Institute for the Study of
International Migration (ISIM), Georgetown University, and Jonathan Jacobs, ISIM Research
Assistant, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See infra section II.
2. Id.
3. See infra section III. This was the consensus of a group of experts who met at an
ISIM-sponsored "Workshop on Asylum Representation" on May 22, 2000 in Washington, D.C.
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represented asylum cases are four to six times more likely to succeed than pro
se ones.4 The time has come to develop ways for all asylum seekers to have
the type of legal assistance needed to more fully ensure that bona fide
refugees receive the protection that the U.S. public wants to give them and
that our laws require.
Despite the importance of legal representation, there has yet to be a
systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the current delivery mechanisms
in place to aid those in need of legal services and the effect of representation
on the asylum system in general.5 This paper examines the state of affairs
with regard to asylum representation and attempts to understand better the
barriers to representation. It also begins to assess the effects of representation
on asylum seekers and the asylum system itself, and to analyze the various
ways in which the representation system can be improved.
I. THE PROCESS
Asylum claims can be processed through two different procedures. Affir-
mative application procedures apply when the asylum applicant, after enter-
ing the United States, applies for asylum prior to the initiation of removal
proceedings.6 In contrast, defensive application procedures apply when the
application for asylum is made (1) after the INS has apprehended the
applicant and has begun proceedings to remove the individual from the
United States 7 or (2) the applicant's affirmative application has been rejected
and referred to an Immigration Court.8
An asylum seeker submitting an affirmative application for asylum is
granted a non-adversarial interview with an INS Asylum Officer.9 The
affirmative applicant may be granted asylum based solely on the affirmative
application and interview.' ° If the Asylum Office does not grant asylum, the
4. This finding is derived from data compiled internally by the Executive Office for Immigration
Review ("EOIR"), which was provided to the authors by Lynn Petersburg, Deputy Assistant Director
of the EOIR Administrative Division on May 4, 2000 [hereinafter "EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum
Decisions: FY 1999"]. A summary of the findings based on this data, as well as on data independently
provided to the authors by the Immigration and Naturalization Service Asylum Office, is appended to
this article along with tables created by the authors.
5. In 1988, Professor Stephen Legomsky called for a broad examination of the role of legal
representation in the asylum process. Such an examination would look at (1) the usefulness of
representation at various stages of immigration proceedings, (2) the number of asylum seekers
represented at various stages of immigration proceedings, (3) whether the representatives were
lawyers, law students, or individuals with no legal training, and (4) the correlation of these facts to the
quality of the representation and disposition of the cases. He also suggested that research be
conducted regarding the devices that could be employed to facilitate the representation of asylum
seekers who cannot afford private counsel, including the appropriateness of non-lawyer representa-
tion. See Stephen H. Legomsky, A Research Agenda for Immigration Law: A Report to the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 227, 232 (1988).
6. See generally Immigration and Naturalization Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2001).
7. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b)(3)(ii) (2001).
8. Id. § 208.4(b)(3)(iii).
9. Id. § 208.9(b).
10. Id. § 208.13(a).
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case is then referred to the Immigration Court where proceedings to remove
the applicant from the United States begin immediately."
Alternatively, if the INS apprehends an individual before he files an
affirmative application, the individual is automatically placed in removal
proceedings, where he can then raise a claim of asylum as a defense to
removal. 12 If apprehended at a point of entry and without proper travel
documentation, the asylum seeker is subjected to expedited removal.' 3 To
avoid immediate deportation, such a detained asylum seeker must either
request to apply for asylum or indicate a fear of persecution to an immigra-
tion official.' 4 If the asylum seeker does neither, he may be deported
immediately. 15 If the asylum seeker passes this initial inspection, he partici-
pates within a matter of days in an interview with an Asylum Officer where
he must demonstrate that he has a credible fear of persecution.1 6 A negative
determination can lead to immediate deportation. 17 The asylum seeker's only
recourse following a negative determination at this "credible fear" interview
is a quick review of that decision by an Inmigration Judge.1 8 If the
Immigration Judge sustains the Asylum Officer's determination, no further
appeal is possible and the asylum seeker can be deported.' 9 Those who
demonstrate a credible fear of persecution are placed in formal removal
proceedings.2°
The removal hearing is an adversarial one conducted by an Immigration
Judge.2' A Trial Attorney represents the INS.22 The Immigration Judge may
grant or deny asylum and other forms of relief from removal.23 The
Immigration Judge's determination can be appealed to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals and ultimately to the federal courts.24
II. ACCESS TO REPRESENTATION
Under U.S. law, an asylum seeker has the right to hire counsel to represent
him or her in formal removal proceedings before the Immigration Court, and
11. The only exception to this is when the asylum seeker is in legal status (e.g., a foreign student),
in which case a decision not to grant asylum is issued without any referral to the Immigration Court.
See id. § 208.14(c)(2).
12. Id. § 208.2(b).
13. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2001).
14. Id. § 1225(b)(l)(A)(ii).
15. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
16. Id. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(ii).
17. Id. § 1225(b)(I)(B)(iii)(I).
18. The statute states that "[r]eview shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible, to the
maximum extent practicable within 24 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after" the Asylum
Officer determination. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).
20. Id. § 208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B).
21. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2001).
22. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.16(a) (2001) (noting that "[t]he government may be represented in
proceedings before an immigration judge").
23. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(a), 208.16, 208.17 (2001).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 242 (2001).
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in any appeals proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals or the
Attorney General.25 Unlike the right to counsel exercised by those in the
criminal justice system, this privilege is confined: it must come at no expense
to the government.26 Currently, then, an asylum seeker must either find and
pay for counsel, or secure free representation. Given this constraint, what
access do asylum seekers actually have to representation? To answer this
question and others about the import of representation, the authors requested
and received data from two Department of Justice agencies. The Asylum
Division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS Asylum
Office") provided data for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and the first seven months
of 2000 with regard to affirmative asylum applications that were originally
filed after the 1995 asylum reforms.2 7 The Executive Office for Immigration
Review ("EOIR") provided data on asylum cases completed in fiscal year
1999. The analysis presented in this article is based on this information.
What does this data tell us? As discussed below, this information provides
a clear picture with regard to the access that asylum seekers have to
representation. This data also demonstrates the importance of representation
in determining outcomes. Interestingly, this data also raises important ques-
tions that strongly encourage further research.
First, this data shows that access to counsel in our current system is
limited. At the affirmative application stage, only one in three applicants is
aided by representation. 28 This is a critical stage in the system, as the vast
majority of asylum seekers in removal proceedings (well over 80%) are
referred by an Asylum Officer.29 Representation changes considerably at the
Immigration Court stage, where about two of every three asylum seekers are
represented.3°
Second, the ability to obtain counsel differs by nationality. In FY 1999,
asylum seekers referred from the affirmative process to the Immigration
Court had a representation rate of 64% overall.3' Well above that average
were asylum seekers from Yugoslavia (98%), Nicaragua (93%), China
(90%), Sri Lanka (88%), and Cuba (87%).32 Those from Vietnam (17%),
25. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2001). In conformance with this
law, the asylum regulations permit asylum seekers to have representation at no government expense.
8 C.F.R. § 208.9. But the expedited removal statute restricts those eligible for a credible fear
interview to "consulting" with a person of the asylum seeker's choosing, at no expense to the
government and without unreasonably delaying the process. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2001).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2001).
27. The INS Asylum Office has separated out data for the applications made prior to the major
reforms instituted in 1995 and those that were part of the large backlog that built up in the early
1990's. The analysis in this article is based solely on the new so-called "reform" cases.
28. INS, Asylum Grants, Denials, and Interviewed Referrals: FY 1999 and 2000, Table 6.
29. See EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 7 (55,250 affirmative cases
and 10,242 defensive ones).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 3.
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Guatemala (29%), and El Salvador (50%) were well below that average.33
Precisely what accounts for these differences is not clear but demands serious
examination.
Third, access to representation also varied depending on geographic
location within the U.S. In FY 1999, the national representation rate for
affirmative cases at Immigration Court was 64%. 34 Asylum seekers in New
York City (87%), Newark (84%), Las Vegas (78%), and Philadelphia (78%)
were far more likely to be represented than the national average (64%). By
comparison, those in Atlanta (23%), San Diego (47%), Los Angeles (51%)
and Miami (55%) were far less likely to be represented. What accounts for
these differences is also worthy of close study.
III. REPRESENTATION OUTCOMES IN THE ASYLUM PROCESS
Access to representation is clearly limited, then, but does this matter in
terms of outcome? Here the data demonstrates that representation matters
considerably. Asylum seekers referred through the affirmative process to
Immigration Court are more than six times more likely to be granted asylum
if they are represented.36 Those placed into defensive proceedings by the INS
are more than four times more likely to be granted asylum if they have
representation.37 Representation matters even among nationalities that have
an above-average success rate for gaining pro se affirmative asylum: 50% of
Armenian asylum seekers were granted asylum when represented versus
25% when pro se; 54% of represented Somalis versus 22% for Somalis who
represented themselves; and 46% of represented Chinese asylum seekers
won asylum as opposed to 13% of those without representation. 38 For certain
nationalities with relatively average or low rates of success for the pro se
affirmative applicant, representation is particularly meaningful: 31% of those
represented from India won asylum as opposed to 1% who were not
represented, and 60% of Liberian asylum seekers were granted asylum when
39
represented but only 8% when pro se.
33. Id. This is also the case with respect to the representation rate for those placed in defensive
proceedings by the INS. The national average in FY 1999 was 82%. Id. Asylum seekers from Sri
Lanka (99%), Bangladesh (98%), China (96%), Yugoslavia (95%), and Pakistan (91%) had high
representation rates, while those from Vietnam (57%), Laos (61%), Honduras (69%), Cuba (70%) and
Guatemala (70%) had relatively low rates. Id.
34. EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 7.
35. EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 4. In defensive cases, most
localities are not too different than the national average of 82% representation. Even the areas with
relatively low representation for affirmative cases come close to the national average: Atlanta (75%),
San Diego (78%), Los Angeles (89%) and Miami (88%). New York City leads all localities with 98%
representation.
36. EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 1.
37. Id.
38. EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 4.
39. Id. While not discussed here, the data also shows that the impact of representation varies
according to location. See EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 5. Further
research is needed to understand why this is the case.
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The disparities of the above comparisons are amplified when one takes
into consideration the fact that these figures include only those who actually
showed up for their merit hearings and received a grant or denial of asylum.
Those who failed to appear in Immigration Court for their merit hearing (a
very sizeable group dominated by claimants who lack representation as
detailed further below), have already been filtered out of this analysis.
These statistics, then, tell us that legal assistance is crucial to a successful
asylum claim. The data does not explain, however, why this is the case. Are
higher success rates a result of representatives choosing to accept promising
asylum seekers? Are representatives turning down potentially meritorious
applicants when, for example, documentation is difficult to obtain or the legal
issues are complex? How well do the screening mechanisms that organiza-
tions employ to refer a large number of applicants to potential representatives
work? Would the asylum seekers who had their cases rejected by these
screening mechanisms have been successful if they had managed to retain
representation?
Furthermore, as noted above, asylum applicants without representation
often do not appear at court, conceding denial of their claims.4 ° In FY 1999,
over 6,000 unrepresented affirmative applicants were eight times more likely
than represented affirmative applicants to abandon their claims at the
Immigration Court stage a.4 Again, these individuals voluntarily applied for
asylum, thus affirmatively identifying themselves to the INS and exposing
themselves to removal proceedings. One may question why such individuals
would voluntarily identify themselves to the INS and then fail to appear. Do
these no-shows have meritorious claims that could have been successful with
the aid of representation, or are these asylum seekers without representation
because subsequent screening revealed that their claims were, in fact,
baseless? Did they seek representation but were unable to find counsel, or did
they fail to obtain counsel knowing they had no intent to appear? With such a
multitude of unanswered questions, we should use caution when drawing
conclusions about the impact that representation has on the asylum process.
However, from the data available, it seems clear that those with representa-
tion do have some palpable advantage in navigating the system and achieving
positive outcomes.
Given the obstacles that confront non-citizens seeking asylum, it is not
hard to imagine why legal representation matters. In order to prepare a
comprehensive asylum claim, the applicant must be able to demonstrate
cogently and credibly that he has been, or might be, subject to persecution on
the basis of specific attributes. To do this effectively, the applicant often must
be able to gather information about conditions in his home country, locate
40. EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 2.
41. Id. (the no-shows were 30% of all pro se affirmative applicants; the no-show rate for
represented affirmative applicants was 3.5%).
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witnesses to, and documentation of, past persecution, and adequately explain
any apparent discrepancies in his story. Without the aid of competent
representation, the task of adequately preparing even for an Asylum Officer
interview can be daunting. When confronted with a formal hearing before an
Immigration Judge, preparation becomes even more crucial. In this light, it is
not surprising that the statistics show that represented applicants obtain relief
at a significantly higher rate than unrepresented ones.
A. Representation at Different States in the Asylum Application Process
It is important to note that the role of representation varies depending on
the stage in the asylum application process. When an asylum seeker without
proper travel documents is detained at a point of entry, he may be subject to
expedited removal (immediate removal without recourse to a hearing) if he
does not express a credible fear of returning to his home country.42 Due to
fear of authority, language barriers, general confusion, and an asylum
seekers' lack of knowledge about his legal rights, officials may not recognize
his credible fear.43 If the secondary inspector refers an applicant to an
Asylum Officer, credible fear interviews can sometimes last hours. 44 Unfor-
tunately, at this stage, access to legal representation is significantly restricted
to "consulting" once a secondary inspector determines that an asylum seeker
is eligible for a credible fear interview. 45 In many cases, such an individual
has just a few days to obtain representation. While full representation may be
impractical in this context, some sort of assistance is crucial in light of the
fact that asylum seekers face immediate deportation into a potentially life
46threatening situation.
At the affirmative application stage, it is important that the applicant tell
his story clearly and credibly. Extensive pre-interview preparation is very
important as an asylum interview can be just as, if not more, rigorous than a
hearing before an immigration judge.47 As these interviews are conducted
42. See supra section I.
43. The behavior of INS secondary inspectors is also a critical factor in this very brief
"inspection." The official's attitude and compliance with processing procedures may seriously affect
the ability to recognize a credible fear. Unfortunately, little is known about this process as the INS has
refused requests by researchers to study this important stage of expedited removal.
44. This observation is based on the authors' informal interviews with asylum officers.
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(iv).
46. INS Asylum Officers appear to be applying a low threshold for an asylum seeker to meet the
credible fear requirement, as evidenced by a very high approval rate. INS Fact Sheet, FY 1998 Update
on Expedited Removals, June 21, 1999, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/
factsheets/Expedite.htm (86% of those referred to and interviewed by Asylum Officers met the
credible fear standard). This may be in part because of the problems with this procedure just noted,
including very restricted access to representation. If the INS raises that threshold, representation at
this stage will become a very critical issue. As noted above, however, very little is known regarding
the secondary inspection determination of eligibility for a credible fear interview. Representation
may be critical if secondary inspectors are improperly returning those who merit such an interview.
Again, language, fear, confusion, and other factors may contribute significantly to such problems.
47. This insight is based on the authors' informal interviews with asylum practitioners.
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behind closed doors, the need for a third party to monitor the proceedings is
crucial for fair treatment. Moreover, there is a heightened potential for future
prejudice if the affirmative application contains misleading or incorrect
factual information (dates, for example) that might adversely affect an
applicant's credibility at latter stages. Consequently, while the vast majority
of applicants do not seek or retain a representative at this stage, representa-
tion at the affirmative stage may actually be more cost effective to the system
than waiting until the Immigration Court stage. At the post-interview stage,
an effective representative can also ensure that mistaken referrals to Immigra-
tion Court are kept to a minimum.48 Furthermore, many non-citizens without
legal recourse may decide to voluntarily remove themselves from the process
altogether if they consult a legal representative prior to filing affirmatively.
At the Immigration Court hearing stage, the complexity of the legal and
procedural issues make it very difficult for asylum seekers to successfully
navigate pro se. Without representation, preparing and presenting a persua-
sive case is very difficult. However, because of the added complexity, the
time commitment for the representative is greater and the costs involved
increase too. Most asylum seekers who proceed to this stage do, however,
seek the aid of a representative.49 Yet as reported above, there are a
significant number of applicants who are unable to secure representation
despite their best efforts, and the quality of representation remains uneven for
those who do.50
The asylum system bears significant costs when claimants cannot find
representation. First and foremost, cases are delayed for considerable periods
of time as asylum seekers search for counsel. When Immigration Judges
realize that a respondent is asserting an asylum claim, they prefer to proceed
when the claim can be presented with the assistance of counsel. 5' For this
reason, they often grant continuances giving the asylum seeker time to locate
representation.52 Second, when competent representation is involved, the
cases are presented more effectively and efficiently from the Immigration
Judge's perspective. Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that the
significant number of cases where asylum seekers do not show up for their
hearings are closely related to the lack of representation,53 thus adding to the
overall inefficiency of the system.
48. In appropriate circumstances, representatives can make a difference to the system and the
outcome through filing Rebuttals to Notices of Intent to Deny, motions to reopen before the case
reaches the court, complaints to supervisors on the misconduct of officers, or motions to terminate
court proceedings and remand cases to the Asylum Office.
49. See Felinda Mottino, Moving Forward: The Role of Legal Counsel in Immigration Court, at
11 (Vera Institute of Justice, July 2000) (on file with authors) [hereinafter "Mottino Draft Report"].
This report was based on research performed by Mottino on behalf of the Vera Institute of Justice but
was not published. It is used here by permission of the author.
50. See supra section II; see also Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 33.
51. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 47.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 13-14.
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IV. BARRIERS TO REPRESENTATION
What can be done to improve access to representation and strengthen the
asylum system for all involved? First, we need to understand why asylum
seekers do not have adequate access to legal services generally. At the outset,
potential applicants are handicapped by the general dearth of attorneys
qualified to practice asylum law. This limited pool of representatives shrinks
further when one counts only those representatives whose practice is limited
to immigration law. Moreover, applicants often lack the resources needed to
retain private representation, especially in light of the fact that current
regulations ban applicants from obtaining work authorization prior to the
grant of asylum unless 180 days have passed since the date of application. 54
Estimates of fees charged by a private attorney representing an asylum
applicant in the New York City area, for example, range between $1,500 and
$2,000. 55 While such fees are beyond the means of most potential asylum
applicants, some private attorneys charge even more.
Furthermore, many asylum seekers face language barriers, fear communi-
cation with officials, and are generally disoriented and confused by their new
surroundings upon arrival in the United States.5 6 Many are not comfortable
conversing with those outside of their ethnic community, and the process of
seeking out an attorney may seem overwhelming.57 Acts as simple as using
public transportation or reading the yellow pages are extremely difficult for
many asylum seekers.58 Additionally, many are simply unaware of the need
to file an affirmative application for asylum, a fact that becomes crucial in
light of the fact that asylum seekers must now utilize their right to apply for
asylum within one year of entering the United States.59 As a result, asylum
seekers most in need of representation often do not initially seek representa-
tion, and many seeking representation are not able to pay for competent
representation.
With this in mind, it is not surprising that there are many non-lawyers in
the various ethnic communities who seek to aid asylum seekers with
affirmative applications for asylum.60 While non-expert advice is sometimes
well intentioned, in a number of cases, such representatives have taken
advantage of potentially meritorious applicants, charging high fees for
preparation of shoddy and oftentimes fraudulent or misleading applica-
tions.6' Of particular interest is the phenomenon of so-called "notarios", who
54. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a).
55. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 35.
56. Id. at 24.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 8 C.F.R. § 208(a)(2)(B).
60. See Robert Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Impoverished
Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 652 (1994).
61. Id.
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hold themselves out as being able to provide quasi-legal services to potential
applicants in U.S. cities with large Hispanic communities.62 While notaries
are regarded much like lawyers in many foreign countries, with the ability to
give legal advice, this is not the case in the United States.63 Unscrupulous
"notarios" seize on the misperception and the comfort level of those in the
Hispanic community to bilk potential applicants of money in return for
immigration advice that is often incorrect, misleading, or illegal. 64 Unfortu-
nately, even when the individuals seeking to aid asylum seekers are well
meaning, their lack of legal expertise often hurts an applicant's case and
dissuades the applicant from seeking legitimate legal advice that may be
otherwise available.
An even more pernicious development is the increased use of smugglers
by asylum seekers. The services provided by smugglers often include a
completed asylum application to be used if the asylum seeker is appre-
hended. These are usually boilerplate applications based on previously
successful cases. Even asylum seekers with compelling personal histories
and promising claims may use these applications rather than their own
experiences.
In detention centers, access to representation is challenged even further.
Many detention centers are located outside of heavily populated areas,
making it extremely difficult for representatives to service clients in those
centers.65 To make matters worse, in certain districts, the INS has been
known to transfer represented claimants in metropolitan areas to distant
detention facilities.66 Additionally, detainees have limited access to phones,
legal materials, and procedural information.67 Though the INS has begun to
improve the situation in response to considerable prodding by concerned
advocacy groups, representation rates have remained extremely low in
detention facilities.68 Of those asylum seekers detained by the INS at the time
62. Id. See also Milagros Cisneros, H.B. 2659: Notorious Notaries - How Arizona is Curbing
Notario Fraud in the Immigrant Community, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 287 (2000) (describing Arizona's
attempt to regulate this practice); Scott Daniels, The Bar, the Courts, the Legislature and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 14 UTAH BAR J. 6, 6-7 (2001) (noting that the majority of complaints
to the Utah Bar Association's unauthorized practice committee involve claims of predation by
"notarios").
63. See Cisneros, supra note 62, at 294-99.
64. Id. at 299-306.
65. See WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, LIBERTY DENIED: WOMEN
SEEKING ASYLUM IMPRISONED IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1997), available at www.womenscommission.
org [hereinafter WOMEN'S COMMISSION REPORT]. See also AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIA-
TION, 1998-99 AILA MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY AND RESOURCE GUIDE 219-21, 229 (1998) (stating that
in 1998, there were four members of the American Immigration Lawyers Association in all of West
Virginia, whereas New York City alone had over 500).
66. WOMEN'S COMMISSION REPORT supra note 65, at 34-35. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS (1999), available at http://web.amnesty.org/
aidoc/aidoc-pdf.nsf/index/AMR510511999ENGLISH/$File/AMR5105199.pdf.
67. See WOMEN'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 65, at 31.
68. As a percentage, more than twice as many detained asylum seekers lack representation when
compared with non-detained asylum seekers in defensive removal proceedings. See Table 8 in the
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of their Immigration Court appearance, about three in ten do not have
69representation.
Even non-detained applicants who are actively searching for representa-
tion have trouble obtaining representation. Data demonstrates that asylum
seekers appearing in Immigration Court are granted numerous continuances
to find an attorney, a process that often takes months, and is occasionally
wholly unsuccessful. 70 A Vera Institute of Justice study of cases at Federal
Plaza in New York found that over one-third of individuals appearing in
Immigration Court there obtained at least one adjournment to find a lawyer,
but were ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining representation. 7' Of those who
completed their cases without counsel, almost 20 percent took two more
adjournments to seek representation, but were ultimately unable to obtain
counsel.72
V. QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
Even when matched with an attorney, asylum seekers must worry about
the quality of representation. It is generally recognized that the majority of
legal representatives are not sufficiently proficient in this evolving area of
law to represent individuals who may face serious threats to life or liberty if
returned to their home country. Relatively few law schools offer courses in
refugee and asylum law and schools that offer immigration courses often
devote very little time to asylum law. Additionally, many of the mechanisms
for providing legal services to asylum seekers rely on pro bono attorneys.73
While the efforts of these attorneys should be applauded, and the success
rates are generally very high, attorneys who practice immigration law
infrequently are invariably newcomers to the refugee law field. Conse-
quently, most attorneys practicing asylum law have minimal formal training
in the field.
VI. ELEMENTS THAT CAN BOLSTER THE ACCESS TO AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
How can we address the barriers to finding competent representation? For
purposes of organization, we have identified four practices that can help
bolster access to, and quality of, representation: (1) provision of information
to asylum seekers; (2) referral of asylum seekers to legal resources; (3)
expanded representation; and (4) education and training for those providing
Appendix. See also, e.g., Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Asylum
seekers: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1663-75 (1997).
69. EOIR, Immigration Court Asylum Decisions: FY 1999, Table 8.
70. Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 27-32.
71. Id. at 29. This number includes all Immigration Court cases, not just asylum cases.
72. Id. at 28.
73. See Taylor, supra note 68, at 1693.
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representation to asylum seekers. While we have isolated these four elements
for purposes of discussion, it will become clear that both current programs
and proposals for future programs often focus on more than one element.
A. Provision of Information to Asylum seekers
In order for potential asylum applicants to seek appropriate representation,
the applicant needs information about asylum rights, options, and processes
in general.
1. Legal Orientation Presentations
One option for disseminating information, utilized primarily in the context
of detained asylum seekers, has been the legal orientation presentation.74
This model was pioneered by the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights
Project ("Florence Project") in Arizona.75 In recognition of the success of the
Florence Project and the possibility that orientation presentations might
increase the efficiency of the Immigration Court process, the Executive
Office for Immigration Review commissioned a pilot project to analyze the
effectiveness of rights presentations at three locations during fiscal year
1998. It was hoped that giving detained asylum seekers rights presentations
would ultimately save the government money by shortening asylum seekers'
time in detention facilities and utilizing immigration judges' time more
effectively.
76
The legal orientation presentation model has been labeled the Justice and
Efficiency Model, as the goal of the project is to "(1) to ensure detained
respondents' access to justice, while (2) maximizing the efficient delivery of
justice for the INS and the EOIR[.] ' ' 77 The model employs an approach that
recognizes the capacity of individual respondents to comprehend legal
information about their legal rights, court procedures, and potential remedies,
and to play an active role with counsel, the INS, and the EOIR during the
proceedings. In the model orientation presentation, the project staff conducts
a daily 45-minute rights presentation for a group of potential applicants at the
detention facility followed by a question and answer session with staff
attorneys.78 The presentation is followed by brief individual conferences
with each respondent to determine whether the respondent wishes to accept
removal, seek voluntary departure, or ask for a "reset" to have an individual
interview to assess their potential relief from removal and release eligibil-
74. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, EVALUATION OF THE
RIGHTS PRESENTATION, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir (last visited Jun. 14, 2002) [hereinafter
Pilot Project Report].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Christopher Nugent, Strengthening Access to Justice: Prehearing Rights Presentations
for Detained Respondents, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1077, 1078 (1999).
78. Id. at 1079.
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ity.79 Efforts are made to provide representation for those asylum seekers
wishing to contest removal.8°
The data from the pilot programs indicate that as a result of the rights
presentations and individual consultations created efficiencies, the number of
those with meritorious cases receiving representation, as well as the number
of asylum seeks without an opportunity for relief who chose to accept
removal, increased.8' In its report summarizing the pilot projects, the EOIR
determined that "the rights presentation has the potential to save both time
and money for the government while also benefiting detainees. 82 During the
pilot, cases were completed faster, and detainees, with potential meritorious
claims to relief, were more likely to obtain representation.83 The EOIR
further suggested that expansion of the pilot program should be explored.84
In December 2001, Congress appropriated $1 million for legal orientation
programs, the first Congressional spending of its kind. EOIR is expected to
administer these funds through some five to eight programs throughout the
country in 2002. While rights presentations have proven to be effective for a
captive, detained audience, there are good reasons to believe that the
expansion of this model to the non-detained pool of potential applicants
would also be successful.85
Research shows that asylum information is scarce. 8 6 A systematic ap-
proach would start with asylum seekers at the beginning of the process. In
that regard, rights presentations could be given at the seven Asylum Offices
around the country, local legal aid organizations, or ethnic community
organizations, just to name a few options. They could also be offered at
Immigration Court locations. Furthermore, some version of a rights presenta-
tion might be the most effective way to ensure that asylum seekers detained
at points of entry, and subject to expedited removal, are given some
protection from imminent deportation.
2. Other Ideas for Provision of Information
Many methods for improving access to information have been suggested.
While a Senior Research Associate at the Vera Institute of Justice, Felinda
Mottino collected ideas about improving access and organized them into a
three-tiered approach.87 On the first tier, information about the asylum
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1080.
81. See Pilot Project Report, supra note 74, Executive Summary.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 16.
85. The authors are aware of existing programs of legal orientation for non-detainees in Tucson
and Philadelphia.
86. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 24.
87. Felinda Mottino, Memorandum to Advisory Groups Meeting Participants: "Ideas for Improv-
ing Access to Legal Representation," Vera Institute of Justice, New York (March, 1999) (The ideas
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process can be widely distributed to asylum seekers. There are already a
number of local and national organizations that have published asylum
procedure literature in various languages. Distribution of this information
can be accomplished through court clerks, community organizations, exist-
ing pro bono projects, churches, and other appropriate organizations. On
behalf of the Detention Watch Network, for example, the Florence Immigrant
and Refugee Rights Project has produced a "Know Your Rights" video
package to assist individuals detained by the INS to go through the removal
process. 88 The package includes a video introduction to the court process and
a summary of each form of relief from removal, including asylum. Written
materials on asylum and other forms of relief which review the law in depth
and explain the application and hearing process are available in English and
Spanish. On the second tier, information booths and hotlines can be set up,
giving asylum seekers a visible and accessible resource to turn to. These
booths could be set up at points of entry as well as at Immigration Court. On
the third tier, referral panels could be established. These panels would be able
to assess the legal needs of asylum seekers and refer the asylum seeker to an
appropriate legal resource.
B. Referrals
Currently, referrals for free or nominal legal services are done largely on
an ad hoc basis. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.61(a), the Chief Immigration Judge
is responsible for (1) maintaining a current list of organizations and attorneys
qualified to provide such services, and (2) providing the list to those in
immigration proceedings.89 That list can be found on the web9° and is
supposed to be posted at Immigration Court locations and in detention
facilities. The regulations require that it be updated at least quarterly.9 '
However, many of the web referrals are not regularly updated in accordance
with these regulations.92 Given this, it is hard to imagine that the physical
postings at sites where asylum seekers might have access to them are kept as
current as regulations require.
Potential applicants can be better served if the limited resources available
are allocated where they can be of most use. The data coming from the Rights
Presentation model suggests that non-citizens informed that they have no
right to relief often opt for voluntary departure, freeing up the court's time
and opinions expressed in this memo were collected by the researcher and are not necessarily
endorsed by the researcher or the Vera Institute) [hereinafter "Mottino Memorandum").
88. Information provided to the authors by Andrea Black, Staff Attorney, Florence Immigrant and
Refugee Rights Project (December 20, 2001),
89. 8 C.F.R. §3.61(a).
90. http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/probono/probono.htm.
91. 8 C.F.R.§ 3.61(a).
92. Based upon periodic checks done by the authors in 2001, at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/probonol
states.htm.
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and increasing the chances that those with meritorious claims are able to
retain representation. 93 It follows that if non-citizens' claims can be exam-
ined with proper screening tools, those with no plausible relief might exit
from the system, freeing up space for those with potentially valid claims.
Additionally, those in need of more or less assistance can be matched with a
representative with the ability to provide the appropriate level of assistance.
Typically, pro bono projects, law school clinics, and legal aid organiza-
tions screen potential clients, conducting preliminary research into the
veracity of the claims, financial need, and complexity of the legal issues, and
agreeing to represent or refer clients based on whether the client passes the
screening criteria.94 Consequently, clients are often accepted based on the
chances for relief and the ability to find representation elsewhere.95 While
this type of screening may help allocate scarce resources in a fairer, more
efficient manner, there is always the risk that potentially meritorious claims
are screened out and neglected-on the basis of complexity or other reasons.
Mottino laid out another potential model for screening and referral.9 6 This
model would create referral panels located in or near Immigration Courts that
would screen respondents, assess their needs, and refer asylum seekers to a
resource suitably matched with the need of the client, not just applicants
meeting certain criteria.97 Here the Florence model of group presentations
where possible forms of relief are discussed generally could be used.
Afterwards, respondents with additional questions could have a short one-
time consultation session to decide how to proceed. This system would entail
doing preliminary research into the stories of numerous asylum seekers, but,
if successful, would increase the general efficiency of the system sharply.
C. Government-Funded Representation
While access to information and various screening mechanisms might be
able to efficiently match applicants with someone who can provide the
appropriate level of legal services, finding enough people willing and able to
provide some sort of representation remains the key to improving the current
system.
The model that can best provide representation to all asylum seekers
would be a government-funded representation system. Such a proposal
would require significant appropriations, and garnering the political support
for a universal U.S. program today is unlikely. Legislation to pilot test
mandated counsel in three Immigration and Naturalization Service districts
was proposed in January 1999 by New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni-
93. See Nugent, supra note 77, at 1081.
94. See Taylor, supra note 68, at 1665 n.62.
95. Id.
96. See Mottino Memorandum supra note 87, at 8.
97. Id.
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han. 98 In justifying the bill, the Senator contended that asylum seekers should
have the right to representation when faced with removal and that provision
of counsel would save the government money by eliminating the need for
frequent continuances for asylum seekers to secure pro bono counsel.99 More
recent legislation proposed by California Senator Dianne Feinstein would
mandate legal representation for unaccompanied children in immigration
proceedings.100 It is hard to imagine a stronger case for mandated representa-
tion than that of unaccompanied children, who by nature of their age could
not possibly possess the intellectual and emotional competence to negotiate
the asylum process on their own. '
Several countries mandate legal representation. In Holland, Sweden, and
New Zealand, for example, asylum seekers are provided with representation
at government expense depending on the stage of the proceeding and the
strength of the claim. ' 0 2 Interestingly, in Sweden, legal aid is provided in the
first instance only if the claim appears doubtful. '0 3 Other countries, including
Canada, provide legal services to asylum applicants on a needs-based system,
much like the public defender system in place in the United States.'0 In
Canada, provision of free legal services is the domain of the provinces.'
0 5
While needy asylum applicants are provided free legal representation in
Ontario, this is not the case in some other provinces. 10 6 It should be noted,
however, that some countries that provide free or subsidized representation
for those seeking asylum either dictate the number of legal aid hours
available or may not pay the provider enough to provide competent assis-
tance. 1
0 7
To the extent that Congress is not yet ready to fund universally-mandated
representation today, prospects of passing proposals calling for the federal
government to give grants to organizations that facilitate the provision of
legal services might be significantly brighter.'0 8 Grants to charitable organi-
zations or NGO's, enabling these organizations to augment their capacity to
represent asylum seekers, ought to be explored. Funding of projects to
develop the pro bono capacities of the bars where they remain unorganized
98. Amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 173, available at http://
thomas.loc.gov./cgi-bin/query/R?r 106:FLD001 :S00603-S00604.
99. Id.
100. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2000, § 3117, available at http://
thomas.loc.gov./cgi-bin/query/R?r 106:FLDO01:S00603-S00604.
101. More than one-third of unaccompanied children are regularly detained by the INS in county
or municipal juvenile correction centers. EOIR, "The EOIR Pro Bono Program: Fact Sheet,"
December 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/probonolProBonoUpdate.pdf.
102. UNHCR, LEGAL FACTSHEETS ON ASYLUM PROCEDURES IN WESTERN EUROPE (1993).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See comments made in an Irish and N. Irish Law listserve discussion of a newly
implemented representation system, available at http://listserv.heanet.ie/irishlaw.html.
108. See Taylor, supra note 68, at 1695.
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would also be worthwhile. This indirect funding may be more politically
palatable to the government, and in some cases may provide a way around
statutes that limit direct funding of legal representation for non-citizens.
There is precedent for the government funding non-governmental organiza-
tions to assist in the filing of claims by non-citizens. The government funds
Joint Voluntary Agencies to prepare refugee claims abroad for those seeking
resettlement in the U.S.' 09 This is a longstanding and current program. In the
late 1980's, the government funded NGO's to assist undocumented immi-
grants file claims for legalization.
D. Expanding Successful Pro Bono Models Nationally
Pro bono projects, which screen and match asylum seekers with pro bono
attorneys, have been very successful in terms of identifying deserving
asylum seekers and serving a good number of applicants. There are now pro
bono referral organizations operating in at least 30 states." ° The ABA
Immigration Pro Bono Development and Bar Activation Project has commit-
ted hundreds of thousands of dollars to the effort, mostly in the form of
mini-grants to pro bono organizations and technical support for these
organizations - the ABA's largest pro bono effort ever."'
The success of these pro bono projects relies on the continued recruitment
of volunteer attorneys. The projects advertise in local bar publications and
private firms' publications, utilize contacts with pro bono coordinators at
private firms, and rely on aid from existing free legal service organiza-
tions. 11 2 While most lawyers taking cases through this process have no
asylum law experience, the success rates are nonetheless extremely high,
above 85%.' ' 3 In light of the fact that most volunteers have little or no
asylum law experience, these projects need to provide significant training for
the volunteer attorneys and, as the case progresses, crucial back up sup-
port.' 14 These projects will typically provide all necessary legal forms, a
copy of the initial intake interview, pertinent human rights reports, access to
volunteer translators and direction to other resources.' '5
The benefit of such a system is the fact that large numbers of clients can be
109. See United States Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration,
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2002 - Report to the Congress (August 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/prm/refadm/rls/rpts/724.htm.
110. See ABA Immigration Pro Bono Development Project, Partial Directory of Pro Bono Panels
that Need Attorneys (March 6, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/immigprobono/
listforpbattys 1 .html.
Ill. See ABA, Immigration Pro bono Development Project/Bar Activation Program, available at
www.abanet.org/immigprobono/home.html.
112. See Barbara Frey and Deepika Udagama, Assisting Indigent Political Asylum Seekers in the
United States: A Model for Volunteer Legal Assistance, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 661 (1990) (describing
typical pro bono referral organization).
113. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS, available at http://www.probono.net.
114. See Frey and Udagama, supra note 112, at 667.
115. Id.
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served using a minimum amount of resources. Furthermore, more and more
attorneys are exposed to asylum law. In the authors' experience, many find
the experience rewarding and continue to take on more cases, gaining more
experience, becoming more involved in the refugee law field, and encourag-
ing other attorneys to participate. Those involved in the asylum process
believe that, despite the limited amount of refugee law experience, the
quality of the representation provided by these pro bono attorneys is high
because of the time and resources that most of the pro bono attorneys are able
to devote to these cases. 16 Additionally, this system can also be activated in
times of crisis, when an unexpected influx of applicants arrives in a certain
area.' 7 Pro bono projects, such as the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights' Asylum Program, have been highly successful in certain sites.
11 8
However, the success of these projects is predicated on the existence of a
number of private law firms with an abundance of potential volunteer
attorneys and their willingness to take on pro bono cases, such as exists in
New York.'1 9 Consequently, this mechanism will not be successful in areas
where there is not a large enough concentration of potential attorneys.
Furthermore, even cities with the requisite concentration of lawyers have not
had success establishing these types of programs. 12
0
Foundation funding has been critical, and many cities do not have locally
based foundations willing to fund pro bono programs. New York, in particu-
lar, does have a strong funding base and a culture that rewards attorneys for
representing refugees and immigrants, a combination that might help to
explain why representation levels are higher there.' 21 Successful pro bono
models could be expanded to or adapted in areas where lawyers are not well
organized to represent asylum seekers on a pro bono basis, were funding
made available. Success of pro bono programs is also contingent on the
willingness of lawyers in private practice to devote substantial time and
energy to pro bono cases. This depends, in part, on the willingness of large
firms to support its attorneys' pro bono efforts. While the current support
levels at many of the largest firms has been quite encouraging, there is no
guarantee that this support will be sustained. Furthermore, though there has
been a concerted effort to increase representation levels, volunteer attorneys
116. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 37.
117. See, e.g., The Essex County Bar Association's Haitian Asylum Project: An Overview, 167
MAR. N.J. LAW 45 (1995).
118. See Probononet, "Practice Area Host Organization: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,"
available at http://www.probono.net/areas/libraryfiles/hosts-Ichr.htm, (noting its 85% success rate in
asylum cases); Carolyn Amadon, Standing in the Gap: Pro Bono Attorneys Help Unaccompanied
Migrant Children Find Asylum, 15 CBA RECORD 46, 47 (2001) (noting that the Midwest Immigrant
and Human Rights Center in Chicago has a 92% success rate in asylum claims).
119. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 15, 21 (noting the high representation rate in
New York).
120. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 15-16 (discussing possible reasons for
discrepancies in representation levels in various cities).
121. Immigration Roundtable Meeting at the Vera Institute (March 1999).
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are less likely to represent detained applicants, especially where the detention
facilities are not easily accessible. 22 Lastly, despite best intentions, the
inexperience of the volunteer attorneys will always raise questions about the
quality of the representation unless professional training programs are
required.
E. Strengthening the Capacity of the Private Bar and Non-Lawyer
Representation
Many applicants for asylum cannot afford to pay for quality legal ser-
vices. 123 However, there is a viable private bar option for those applicants
who can afford to pay for representation. One would think that the advantage
of the private bar is that these attorneys have more immigration law
experience and have more established relationships with Immigration Judges
and INS counsel. However, this does not seem to be the case. Clients are in a
very vulnerable situation and can be taken advantage of very easily, and
unscrupulous lawyers often prey on these types of clients, overcharging for
routine services or providing clients with shoddy services. The Vera Institute,
in its examination of representation in the New York City area, found that
immigration professionals perceived the vast majority of private attorneys to
be either nominally qualified or totally unqualified. 124 Furthermore, many of
these attorneys maintain very large caseloads and spend little time preparing
each case. 1
25
Despite this data, which suggests that the private bar is often unqualified or
unwilling to provide fully competent representation, the overall success rates
for represented claimants are still far above the success rates for underrepre-
sented clients. 126 Without the aid of the private bar, the needs of the asylum
seeker community could not possibly be met, and thus any system of reform
must include the use of the private bar. However, in order to curb abuse, the
local bar, along with local law enforcement authorities, must take notice of
the behavior of unscrupulous attorneys. Attempts should be made to reward
reputable attorneys, either through official listings or referral services. There
is a mechanism in place to discipline both attorneys and accredited non-
122. See STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 667 (2002) (noting
that the "time costs are prohibitive for even the most public-spirited members of the Bar").
123. In a 1996 survey of immigrants in INS proceedings, 61% noted that they wanted but could
not obtain help, and of these, 62.8% said that the barrier was the expense of representation. See
Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal Immigration Programs: Can They Survive?, 74 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 813, 814 (1997) (citing INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR, BECOMING AMERICAN, SEEKING JUSTICE: THE IMMIGRANTS' LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (April
1996)).
124. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 37 (referring to a 1992-1994 survey).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 40 (noting that national data for 1997 showed that only one percent of unrepresented
respondents in removal hearings won relief as compared to twenty-one percent of those with
counsel).
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lawyer representatives if their actions do not conform to the public good, 27
yet the Vera Institute study discussed above indicates that this mechanism is
failing adequately to address the problem. When unscrupulous representa-
tives are identified, authorities must act swiftly and seriously in order to
dissuade the continued bilking of these vulnerable clients.
Furthermore, training initiatives and continuing legal education ought to
be provided on a regular basis to private attorneys who currently lack the
skills to competently represent applicants. Such programs can be run by the
American Bar Association, qualified charitable organizations, or by the
numerous pro bono project organizations, like the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, which regularly trains pro bono attorneys for asylum work.
In the United States, certain qualified charitable organizations are autho-
rized to provide legal services through accredited representatives, including
non-lawyers. 128 In order to have an employee qualify as an accredited
representative, the qualified charitable organization must submit the appli-
cant's name and the nature and extent of his experience and knowledge of
immigration law and procedure to the Board of Immigration Appeals for
approval. 129 This accredited representative rule was promulgated with the
hope that it would provide the asylum applicant pool access to more aid at a
lower cost and would be able to provide a safety net for applicants unable to
secure the services of a traditional attorney. There are a number of charitable
organizations that have been providing representation for applicants under
this regulation, including Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. and the
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service.' 30 In the Vera Institute draft
study, those interviewed found that most of the representatives from chari-
table organizations, despite having less time and fewer resources at their
disposal relative to pro bono attorneys, were able to provide a high quality of
representation. 131
However, it is questionable whether these charitable organizations have
enough money to ensure the continued viability and quality of this type of
service delivery mechanism. While the regulations permit charitable organi-
zations to charge a "nominal fee," it seems clear that this fee was not intended
to be enough to allow these charitable organizations to sustain themselves
financially.132 Consequently, a number of NGO's have "consistently identi-
fied the 'nominal' fee restriction as one of the principal barriers to their
provision and expansion of legal services and the ABA has pushed to change
the law to allow 'reasonable fees' as opposed to 'nominal.' ,,133 While many
127. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3.
128. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.2.
129. Id.
130. See Kerwin, supra note 123, at 822.
131. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 37.
132. See Kerwin, supra note 123, at 815.
133. Id.
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of these charitable organizations have been able to provide quality represen-
tation, they have done so only by running up a large deficit and relying on
supplementary but limited outside funding. 134 In order to continue providing
quality representation with limited resources, it has been suggested that these
charitable organizations will need to reform their management structure and
adjust representation delivery processes. ' 35
Despite questions about the continued ability of charitable organizations to
provide quality representation on limited budgets, a bolstered system of
non-lawyer representation may be a suitable mechanism for increasing the
availability of legal services to the asylum seeker community. During the
1980's legalization program, the INS entered into agreements with Qualified
Designated Entities (QDE's) to assist applicants in filling out forms, collect-
ing documentation, and preparing for interviews.' 36 The hope was that
non-citizens would feel more comfortable approaching non-governmental
entities for help and advice on immigration matters.137 QDE's consisted of
churches, unions, and numerous immigrant assistance programs, among
others.' 38 Recognition as a QDE allowed staff to be trained regarding the
standards and procedures for filing application, ready access to forms, and
extensions on filing deadlines for those utilizing their services. ' 39 Addition-
ally, these QDE's were reimbursed a nominal fee per application processed
and allowed to charge clients up to $110 for their services.' 40 While fewer
asylum seekers than expected utilized the services provided by the QDE's, 141
the QDE program can be looked to as a workable model for providing asylum
seekers with legal assistance, particularly in terms of providing aid for
affirmative applications.
F. Certification
Other countries have developed systems for licensing non-lawyers to aid
applicants through the asylum procedure.' 42 If implemented in the United
States, such a system would greatly increase the number of people qualified
to aid asylum seekers, would lower the price for such services, and would
134. Id. at 822.
135. See id. at 821-25 (discussing potential reforms in the following categories: mission
statement; expertise of staff; case management; information tracking; low-income clients and fees;
case selection and mix; financial issues; resource development; and marketing).
136. ELIZABETH ROLPH AND ABBY ROBYN, A WINDOW ON IMMIGRATION REFORM: IMPLEMENTING
THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT IN Los ANGELES 69 (1990).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 70.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 83.
142. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION, MULTICULTURAL & INDIGINOUS AF-
FAIRS, "FACT SHEET 100: MIGRATION AGENTS REGISTRATION AUTHORITY" (Revised Jan. 15, 2002),
available at http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/100mara.htm (describing the system of accreditation for
lawyers and non lawyers in the Australian immigration system).
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likely increase the numbers of representatives available within certain ethnic
communities, thus raising the comfort levels of applicants. Such a system has
been used in Australia, where the government certifies licensed "migration
agents". 1 3 Certified migration agents may be traditional attorneys but may
also be individuals who "possess a sound knowledge of migration law and
procedure" as demonstrated by attending a certification course or passing an
examination." 4 Migration agents are subject to a code of conduct and are
required to attend continuing professional development classes. 45 Fees for
the "migration agents" are often less than the fees charged by solicitors.
Additionally, the government pays the fees in cases of financial need.
No doubt, well-intentioned non-lawyers in the United States, with even
minimal training, would be able to aid applicants, especially at the affirma-
tive application stage. However, the problem with an expanded non-lawyer
representation scheme is ensuring the quality of the non-lawyers and success-
fully disciplining when there are problems. As noted above in other contexts,
the potential for abuse of asylum seeker clients is very great. This risk is even
higher without the threat, albeit minimal, of the disciplinary measures that
attorneys are subject to. If the government were to expand the non-lawyer
representation system, safeguards would have to be erected that could
adequately protect asylum seekers from abuse. While non-certified non-legal
representatives would need to be disciplined by state bar associations on an
unauthorized practice of law theory, certified representatives could be subject
at least to the same type of discipline to which accredited representatives are
currently subject-loss of accreditation. 146
G. Education and Training
Obtaining representation is only a first step for most asylum seekers;
ensuring that the retained representation is competent is quite important as
well. Asylum cases often can be some of the most difficult cases to take on,
requiring extensive factual investigation of events that occurred abroad, the
ability to deal with a client who has suffered abuse, an evolving interpretation
of refugee law, and sometimes questions of criminal law as well. Unfortu-
nately, immigration practitioners feel that the majority of representatives are
inadequately qualified to take on asylum work. 1
47
1. Law School Education
The first step to improving the quality of representation is giving future
attorneys the opportunity to take asylum law courses in law school. Currently
there are relatively few courses specifically on asylum law being taught at
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.65.
147. See Mottino Draft Report, supra note 49, at 36.
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law schools across the country. Although there are a number of immigration
law courses being taught, these courses rarely spend more than a lecture or
two on asylum. Consequently, the vast majority of attorneys that take asylum
cases have no formal legal education in asylum law and have been forced to
learn on the job. One bright spot in the area, however, has been the increase in
the number of law school asylum clinics.
2. Law School Clinics
In the last 20 years, the number of law school clinics practicing asylum law
has gone from 2 to at least 35. 148 The success rates for clients served by law
clinics have been extremely high. For instance, at the UC-Davis clinic, as of
early 1998, the clinic had won all but four of hundreds of asylum cases
brought at the Immigration Court level. 149 However, even if the number of
clinics continues to grow, the actual number of clients served by clinics will,
of necessity, remain relatively low. The size of clinics is constrained by
limited resources for faculty supervisors, and students often need to spend a
semester or more on just one case. The academic year also limits the numbers
and types of cases that can be accepted, and scheduling relies heavily on the
cooperation of the local Immigration Court. Additionally, for such a clinic to
be feasible, the law school must be near an Immigration Court. While it
appears that clinics will never be able to serve a critical number of clients,
they can serve a very important role by training aspiring attorneys in asylum
law.
Generally, a law school clinic functions as a small law office, with a few
practicing attorneys/professors acting as supervising attorneys along with at
least one office assistant. 150 Clinics generally avoid cases that could easily be
handled by an inexperienced attorney and those that would prove so difficult
that they would demand excessive resources and might overly frustrate
students.' 5 ' After screening and choosing appropriate cases, the clinic staff
generally assigns the case to a pair of students who work on the case as a
team.' 52 The professors guide the students through the preparation of their
cases; students meet with a professor each week for a case conference to
discuss the status of their case, discuss strategy, legal theories, and various
problems presented by the case. 15 3 The professors conduct asylum skill
seminars, supervise mock hearings, and attend the students' Immigration
148. See Kevin R. Johnson and Amagda Perez, Clinical Legal Education and the U.C. Davis
Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory Into Practice and Practice Into Theory, 51 SMU L. REV.
1423 (1998).
149. Id. at 1432 n.18.
150. Id. at 1435.
151. Id. at 1436-37.
152. Id. at 1437.
153. Id. at 1436.
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Court hearings or the client's Asylum Officer interview. 154 During class, the
students work on clinical skills and have the opportunity to discuss problems,
brainstorm issues, and exchange information with their professors and fellow
students.' 55 While these clinics will never be able to serve a large client
population, the clinics serve as a wonderful training tool. Students who have
passed through the clinical process come away with a solid education in
asylum law and significant practical experience in navigating the asylum
process bureaucracy. Participation in the clinics can serve to motivate young
attorneys to enter public service and gives new attorneys valuable asylum
law experience that can be utilized in pro bono work if the attorneys decide to
enter private practice.
3. Pro bono Projects
Pro bono projects rely almost exclusively on attorneys with absolutely no
experience in asylum law. 156 Consequently, these projects have devoted
significant resources to comprehensive training mechanisms. 5 7 These pro-
grams consist of training videos, compilations of critical cases, provision of
procedure manuals, workshops with practitioners and/or Immigration Judges,
and the availability of staff attorneys or contacts to help answer questions. 158
Often, the training seminars and workshops can count towards Continuing
Legal Education requirements.159 Additionally, the projects can provide
support services such as country condition reports and lists of expert
witnesses - benefits that can save attorneys considerable time. 160 However,
while volunteer attorneys are strongly encouraged to attend training seminars
and to make use of the available resources, most pro bono projects do not
mandate that the volunteers attend any formal training session. Furthermore,
these projects very seldom compile performance evaluations for the volun-
teer attorneys. Nonetheless, most volunteers do take advantage of the training
opportunities, which may account to some degree for the high success rates
of their asylum applicants.
VII. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
The government realizes that the current representation system needs
improvement and has taken steps recently that recognize the importance of
legal representation in the asylum process. First, within the last few years, the
Justice Department has issued a regulation transferring from the INS to the
EOIR the responsibility for maintaining an up-to-date list of qualified
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See Frey and Udagama, supra note 112, at 666.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 667-68.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 669-70.
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representatives. 61 The transfer in authority demonstrates that the govern-
ment recognizes the importance of representation and is willing to place this
responsibility in the hands of the governmental institution that has a natural
interest in ensuring that the adversarial system in immigration procedures is a
real one with representatives on each side. Second, as described earlier,
EOIR funded the rights presentation pilots, 162 and some INS-run facilities
have become more amenable to these types of programs. Rights presenta-
tions now exist in one form or another at several sites. 163 As discussed above,
Congress recently appropriated $1 million for rights presentations.
Third, EOIR appointed a Pro Bono Coordinator in April 2000 to improve
access to legal advice and counseling and increase rates of representation.' 64
The Coordinator is responsible for developing and coordinating a national
program to promote and facilitate pro bono efforts before Immigration
Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. 65 The EOIR position
description listed a number of responsibilities, including analyzing the
effectiveness of the implemented program on a city-by-city basis,
developing an action plan, both short- and long-term to address prob-
lems; provid[ing] support and organizational assistance to those supply-
ing pro bono work; evaluat[ing] legislative changes in terms of effect
on the pro bono program, method of operation, and extent of operation;
[and] recommend[ing] policies and develop[ing] procedures and regu-
lations implementing new or amended legislation...
Steven Lang, the former director of the ProBar program, one of the three
programs involved in the rights presentation pilot, has served as the first Pro
Bono Coordinator. 167 His current efforts include: assisting existing pro bono
efforts in becoming more effective by improving their coordination with
EOIR and the INS; finding or creating new incentives for increased pro bono
attorney involvement; coordinating a pilot project aimed at increasing pro
bono representation for detained non-citizens whose cases are under appeal
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); promoting the use of group
Legal Orientation Presentations and distribution of "Know Your Rights"
self-help materials to immigrants detained by the INS; seeking to develop pro
bono services for unaccompanied children in INS custody; and developing an
educational program to improve the quality of advocacy before the Immigra-
161. 62 Fed. Reg. 9071 (1997), (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3, subpart E at 3.61). See also
Developments in the Executive Branch, II GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 903 (1997).
162. See supra Section IV.A.1.
163. Programs exist at detention facilities in the following locations: Los Angeles, Chicago,
Florence, Eloy, Arizona, Harlingen, Texas, Elizabeth, New Jersey, Wackenhut, Queens, New York,
and York, Pennsylvania. Programs for the non-detained exist in Philadelphia and Tucson.
164. See EOIR, "Fact Sheet: Steven C. Lang" (April 2000) [hereinafter Lang Fact Sheet],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/fs/langbio.htm.
165. See EOIR, Pro Bono Coordinator Job Announcement (April 23, 1999) (on file with authors).
166. Id.
167. See Lang Fact Sheet, supra note 164.
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tion Court and increase the level of pro bono representation.168 EOIR's Pro
Bono Program currently organizes legal training sessions for pro bono
representatives of unaccompanied children as well as a Model Hearing
Program where attorneys and law students receive mock trial training in
Immigration Court presented by volunteer Immigration Judges. 1
69
CONCLUSION
These government initiatives are a worthwhile beginning, but much more
must be done. There are a number of other options that the government can
explore. Senator Feinstein's proposal to provide mandated representation for
unaccompanied children makes sense-how can we possibly expect children
to represent themselves or to find representation? Serious consideration
should be given to proposals like Senator Moynihan's to test universally
mandated representation. At the same time, many other possibilities might
vastly improve the current representation situation. Beyond the handful of
Legal Orientation Presentation programs funded in FY 2002, the government
can provide grants for additional rights presentations in detention centers and
elsewhere. Ultimately, the legal orientation program should reach all asylum
seekers and other non-citizens who seek protection or relief before the INS or
EOIR. Grants can also be provided to well established non-profits to augment
their ability to represent asylum seekers or find talented pro bono representa-
tion. The government might also explore providing direct funding for
representation on a discretionary basis. In such a program, Immigration
Judges might make a preliminary determination of an asylum seekers'
eligibility for representation. In those cases where the Judge deems that
representation would serve both justice and efficiency, a representative could
be appointed. Lastly, authority to sanction unscrupulous representatives
ought to be used when misbehavior is uncovered.
In sum, it is clear that asylum representation needs improvements so that
asylum seekers receive a meaningful opportunity to present their claims. It is
also imperative to improve the efficiency of the asylum system. Systematic
research on the effectiveness of various representation mechanisms as to
outcome and system operations should be carried out. It is equally clear that
there are elements of current programs that, if broadly funded, could vastly
improve the current state of representation. Finally, the legislative proposals
that provide mandated representation for discrete groups such as children or
that test universal representation hold out considerable promise for improv-
ing our current system of justice for those fleeing persecution.
168. EOIR, "The EOIR Pro Bono Program: Fact Sheet," (December 2001) (on file with authors).
The BIA Pro Bono Project secured counsel for over 80 detained non-citizens in its first ten months. In
FY 2000, almost 2,300 of some 4,900 detained non-citizens proceeded pro se in their BIA appeals. Id.
169. In the Model Hearing training sessions, participants receive hands-on court training
emphasizing practice, procedure, and advocacy skills. They obtain Continuing Legal Education credit
and commit to a minimal level of pro bono representation throughout the year. Model Hearing
sessions have already been held in San Diego, Dallas, and York, Pennsylvania. Id.
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APPENDIX
Asylum Representation Study Findings
1. Representation matters in pursuing a claim in a complex legal system
and in a foreign language.
Outcomes: 4-6 times more likely to be granted asylum when repre-
sented (Table 1)
No shows: pro se are 8 times more likely not to show at Immigration
Court (no shows make up 30% of the pro se caseload in affirmative
cases, over 6,000 in FY 1999) (Table 2)
2. Nationality matters as to who gets represented.
Affirmative Cases: 17% (Vietnam) to 98% (Yugoslavia); national
average 64% (Table 3)
Defensive Cases: 57% (Vietnam) to 99% (Sri Lanka); national
average 82% (Table 3)
3. Locality matters as to who gets represented and just how important
representation is to outcome.
Representation: the range is considerable-from 23% in Atlanta and
51% in Los Angeles to 87% in New York in affirmative cases
(Table 4)
Outcomes: while representation makes a considerable difference
everywhere, the degree of difference varies significantly. The na-
tional grant rate for represented asylum seekers in affirmative pro-
ceedings was 37%; Seattle, Miami, Houston, and Arlington grant
rates were all between 20-25%, while Baltimore and Philadelphia
have 54% and 49% grant rates, respectively, for represented asylum
seekers (Table 5)
4. Too many asylum seekers lack any kind of representation (let alone
competent representation).
INS Asylum Offices Hearings: 3 out of 4 were not represented in FY
1998; 2 out of 3 were not represented in FY 1999 and first part of FY
2000 (Table 6)
Immigration Court Hearings, affirmative cases (which constitute
80+ % of all cases): more than 1 out of 3 lack representation (20,000
in FY99) (Table 7)
2002]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
Detention Hearings: as a percentage, more than twice as many
detained asylum seekers lack representation when compared with
non-detained asylum seekers in defensive proceedings (Table 8)
Sources: EOIR (FY 1999); INS Asylum Office (FY 1998 and 1999)
TABLE 1: ASYLUM REPRESENTATION IN IMMIGRATION COURT BY OUTCOME,
FY 1999
Defensive Grant Rates
Deny Grant Grant Rate
Represented 3,067 1,827 37%
Pro Se 823 77 9%
Affirmative Grant Rates
Deny Grant Grant Rate
Represented 10,616 6,229 37%
Pro Se 3,628 223 6%
Source: EOIR
TABLE 2: ASYLUM REPRESENTATION IN AFFIRMATIVE PROCEEDINGS
BY No SHOWS, FY 1999
Pro Se Represented
Total Cases 19,919 35,331
No Shows 6,025 1,245
% No Show 30% 4%
Source: EOIR
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TABLE 3: ASYLUM REPRESENTATION BY NATIONALITY IN IMMIGRATION COURT,
FY 1999
Affirmative Defensive
Country Represented Pro Se Total Represented Pro Se Total
Yugoslavia 98% 2% 537 95% 5% 215
Nicaragua 93% 7% 2,480 86% 14% 393
China 90% 10% 5,621 96% 4% 1,657
Sri Lanka 88% 12% 93 99% 1% 347
Cuba 87% 13% 397 70% 30% 843
Russia 81% 19% 1,028 79% 21% 115
Bangladesh 80% 20% 1,133 98% 2% 45
Nigeria 79% 21% 527 79% 21% 238
India 73% 27% 2,563 92% 8% 221
Peru 70% 30% 1,584 89% 11% 107
Pakistan 67% 33% 973 91% 9% 126
Haiti 62% 38% 2,064 85% 15% 517
Laos 59% 41% 111 61% 39% 165
Somalia 58% 42% 1,004 89% 11% 173
Honduras 56% 44% 1,466 69% 31% 228
El Salvador 50% 50% 5,366 77% 23% 1,122
Guatemala 29% 71% 8,055 70% 30% 626
Vietnam 17% 83% 196 57% 43% 381
Source: EOIR
2002]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
TABLE 4: ASYLUM REPRESENTATION IN IMMIGRATION COURT BY LOCALITY,
FY 1999
Affirmative Defensive
Office Represented Pro Se Total Represented Pro Se Total
Arlington 65% 35% 1,359 87% 13% 238
Atlanta 23% 77% 1,826 75% 25% 76
Baltimore 64% 36% 1,080 92% 8% 165
Boston 64% 36% 908 73% 27% 225
Chicago 72% 28% 1,179 81% 19% 320
Detroit 74% 26% 818 94% 6% 227
Houston 69% 31% 625 87% 13% 291
Las Vegas 78% 22% 722 80% 20% 138
Los Angeles 51% 49% 13,023 89% 11% 657
Miami 55% 45% 9,569 88% 12% 1,223
New York City 87% 13% 12,314 98% 2% 1,086
Newark 84% 16% 1,721 93% 7% 350
Philadelphia 78% 22% 693 87% 13% 135
San Diego 47% 53% 842 78% 22% 220
San Francisco 65% 35% 4,285 83% 17% 858
Seattle 70% 30% 238 80% 20% 507
Nationwide 35,331 19,919 55,250 8,437 1,805 10,242
Source: EOIR
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TABLE 5: ASYLUM REPRESENTATION IN IMMIGRATION COURT
BY LOCALITY AND OUTCOME, FY 1999
Affirmative Grants Defensive Grants
Office Represented Pro Se Represented Pro Se*
Arlington 25% 4% 35% 0%
Atlanta 5% 0% 15% 0%
Baltimore 54% 6% 55% 0%
Boston 36% 7% 35% 10%
Chicago 37% 15% 28% 9%
Detroit 32% 9% 25% 14%
Houston 23% 3% 21% 38%
Las Vegas 24% 0% 22% 7%
Los Angeles 36% 5% 32% 28%
Miami 22% 10% 27% 8%
New York City 43% 8% 51% 18%
Newark 34% 2% 36% 25%
Philadelphia 49% 4% 34% 0%
San Diego 45% 3% 25% 15%
San Francisco 40% 10% 50% 4%
Seattle 20% 55% 33% 2%
Nationwide 37% 6% 37% 9%
Source: EOIR
* These rates are based on very small numbers of decisions in these local offices.
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TABLE 7: ASYLUM REPRESENTATION BY PLACEMENT IN PROCEEDINGS, FY 1999
Defensive Affirmative Total
Represented 8,437 35,331 43,768
Pro Se 1,805 19,919 21,724
Represented 82% 64% 67%
Pro Se 18% 36% 33%
100% 100% 100%
Total 10,242 55,250 65,492
Source: EOIR
TABLE 8: ASYLUM REPRESENTATION IN DEFENSIVE PROCEEDINGS BY CUSTODY,
FY 1999
Detained Non-detained
Pro Se 657 1,148
Represented 1,512 6,925
% Represented 70% 86%
Source: EOIR
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